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SYMPOSIUM: RECENT- CASES
in the disputed constitutional issue. The focus of the court in Metpath on the
fact that the proposed advertisements contain "information concerning scien-
tific studies of 'general public interest' '" establishes the fact that the public in-
terest which the disputed speech serves to benefit or further is of paramount
importance in allowing certain speech of a commercial form to fall within
the protective embrace of the first amendment. "Public interest" has be-
come the watchword of first amendment protection in the commercial
speech area.
SHERYL S. KANTZ
69 450 F. Supp. at 117.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
First Amendment * Freedom of Speech
Obscenity
Pinkus v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1808 (1978).
N its latest attempt to define a workable standard for obscenity rulings,
the United States Supreme Court has held that children may not be in-
cluded in a court's instruction as to the social group to whom the material
would or would not be obscene. However, the Court held that sensitive
persons and deviant groups may be included without unduly lowering the
threshold of a finding of obscenity. Thus, Pinkus v. United States' clarified
the "community" whose judgment should define obscenity.
William Pinkus was convicted by jury on eleven counts of sending
obscene material through the U.S. mail.' The conviction was reversed on
appeal as the violation occurred in 1971 and Pinkus had been tried under
the Miller v. California' standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in
1973." Pinkus was then convicted on the same eleven counts on retrial under
the standards set forth in Roth v. United States' and Memoirs v. Massachu-
setts,' the conviction this time being affirmed by the court of appeals.' The
'98 S. Ct. 1808 (1978).
2 The charges were for criminal violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970).
s413 U.S. 15 (1973).
4 United States v. Pinkus, No. 73-2900 (9th Cir. Feb. 5, 1975).
5 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
8383 U.S. 413 (1966).
7 United States v. Pinkus, 551 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Supreme Court granted certiorari and Pinkus charged, inter alia, that it was
error for the trial court to include children, sensitive persons and deviant
groups in various portions of the jury instructions relating to the determina-
tion of obscenity.'
The Court held that it was error to include children of the community
in prosecutions of this sort, and based its reversal primarily on that error.
The instruction, as given by the trial court, had been: "In determining com-
munity standards, you are to consider the community as a whole, young and
old, educated and uneducated, the religous and the irreligous, men, women,
and children from all walks of life."9 The Court stated that there was no
evidence the material in question was likely to be received by children or
that the petitioner intended it to be received by children, and that, if children
were included in the consideration of the issue by the jury, the threshold of
a finding of obscenity might be much lower.'0 To the extent that inclusion
of a particular subset of people would facilitate a finding that material, other-
wise protected, is obscene, the Court's reasoning is grounded on the very
basis of the Roth decision."
The trial court's instruction to include sensitive persons read:
Thus the brochures, magazines, and film are not to be judged on the
basis of your personal opinion. Nor are they to be judged by their effect
on a particularly sensitive or insensitive person or group in the com-
munity. You are to judge these materials by the standard of the hypo-
thetical average person in the community, but in determining this aver-
age standard, you must include the sensitive and the insensitive, in
other words, you must include everyone in the community."
It should be noted that in this instruction the district court made the con-
ceptual change from community standards applied by the average person
to the standard of the average person in the community. The shift is im-
portant in determining the propriety of sensitive person inclusion by the
court.
If such a thing as a community standard were to exist within a given
community, it would be the standard held by a majority of the people in
the community. If what was sought were a standard held by a majority of
the people making up the community, individual characteristics would not
be a proper subject for consideration by the jury unless it was first shown
8 98 S. Ct. at 1809.
9 1d. at 1811 (emphasis added).
10 98 S. Ct. at 1812. The Court, however, chose to ignore the similar effect which might
occur due to other subsets which were included in the instructions.
21 See notes 22-23 and accompanying text, intra.
12 98 Sup. Ct. at 1812 (emphasis added).
(V€ol. 12:2
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that those characteristics were shared by that majority. In other words, if
the standard were really to be a "community" standard, for sensitive persons
to be included as such, it should first be shown that the group of persons
holding the majority position was composed of sensitive persons in at least
some significant part.'"
On the other hand, if the standard used were that of the average man
in the community (i.e., an "average" community standard), it may well be
proper to add together the views of all persons in the community, attempting
to arrive at a common denominator. The Supreme Court in Pinkus states
that "the term 'average' person as used in this charge means what it usually
means, and is no less clear than 'reasonable' person used for generations in
other contexts."'" But to the extent that the average man in the context of
obscenity cases is to include sensitive persons, he would seem to bear little
resemblence to the average or reasonable man of other contexts.
In holding that the instruction was not reversible error, the Court raised
a much greater issue than how a community standard is to be determined.
Implicit in the instruction was that sensitive and insensitive persons were
included to emphasize that the community was to include everyone. If it
were proper to enumerate groups to emphasize that everyone is to be included
in the concept of "community," it is difficult to reconcile a holding of rever-
sible error in regard to the inclusion of children with a holding of no rever-
sible error in regard to the inclusion of sensitive persons. Certainly the words
"men, women and children" would seem to emphasize the requirement of
all-inclusiveness, as well as, if not better than, "the sensitive and the insen-
sitive." As with the evidence regarding children, there was no mention of
evidence that sensitive persons were the intended recipients of the matetrial
in question or that the petitioner had reason to know that sensitive persons
were likely to receive the material. If the inclusion of children might cause
a lowering of the threshold for a finding of obscenity, it would seem the
inclusion of sensitive persons would be even more likely to lower that thresh-
old. It was, after all, the fear of lowering the threshold to the point where
material which should be protected might be found obscene that caused the
Court in Roth to reject the previously used English standard and adopt the
community standard test."5
In Pinkus, the Court stated that nothing in its prior opinions "suggests
that 'sensitive' and 'insensitive' persons . . . are to be excluded from the
community as a whole.... ."6 Under a literal reading of those cases, the
23 See generally Bell, Determining Community Standards, 63 A.B.A.J. 1202 (1977).
24 98 S. Ct. at 1813.
15 354 U.S. at 488-89. See notes 18-19 and accompanying text, infra.
is 98 S. Ct. at 1813.
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statement may be true, but the Court also observes that "[tihe vice is in
focusing upon the most susceptible or sensitive members when judging the
obscenity of materials. .. ."" This is the very cornerstone of the Roth opinion
and the community standard test. It is difficult to understand how a juror
can avoid focusing upon sensitive persons after having been specifically in-
structed by the Court that he must include those persons in his evaluation
of the community. To whatever degree sensitive persons are consciously
included, to that degree they must be "focused" upon. If they are not to be
considered and if the underlying principles of Roth are to be followed, it
would seem that mention of sensitive persons, more than any other group,
should be excluded from jury instructions.
In dealing with obscenity cases, the major problem facing the Supreme
Court has not been whether obscenity is constitutionally protected, but
rather the establishment of a standard or test by which obscenity could be
defined. The British standard espoused in Regina v. Hicklin8 was the first
formally adopted by federal courts. Under the Hicklin standard, material
could be found to be obscene if the effect of any excerpted part upon any
person, even the most susceptible person, was to deprave or corrupt that
person's morals.'"
The Supreme Court took a fresh look at the Hicklin standard in Roth
v. United States.2" As defined in Roth, obscene material "deals with sex in
a manner appealing to prurient interest."'" Expressing the fear that legitimate
material might be found to be obscene by sensitive persons judging isolated
parts, the Court expressly rejected Hicklin as unconstitutionally restrictive."2
The new test set forth was "whether to the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to prurient interest. 21 3 The Court stated that obscenity
was not protected as it was "utterly without social importance."" Thus began
a series of attempts, continuing to the present, to define a standard by which
to determine obsenity.
The process of delineation of the Roth standard led to the decision of
21 Id.
IsL.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Burgess,
Obscenity Prosecution: Artistic Value and the Concept of Immunity, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1062 (1964); Lockhart and McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution,
38 MINN. L. REv. 295 (1954).
29United States v. Rosen, 161 U.S. 29 (1896); MacFadden v. United States, 165 F. 51
(3rd Cir. 1908); United States v. Bennett, 24 F.Cas. 1093 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879).
20354 U.S. 476 (1957).
1 ld. at 487.
22Id. at 488-89.
23 Id. at 489.
24 Id. at 484.
[V/ol. 12:2
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Memoirs v. Massachusetts.5 Here, the "utterly without social importance"
basis for rejection of obscenity became part of the standard itself. 6 Now
the test could be expressed as a three-part formula: "(a) the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the
material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community
standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters;
(c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value." -
By way of expressing its dissatisfaction with the third section of the
Memoirs test, the Court altered the standard in Miller v. California."'
The test became:
(a) whether "the average person applying contemporary community
standards," would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest...; (b) whether the work depicts or describes in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applic-
able state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value.2'
While retaining both the "prurient interest" and "patently offensive"
portions of the Roth/Memoirs test, 0 the Court thus made clear that the work
was to be considered as a whole and could be found obscene even though
not totally lacking in "redeeming social value."'"
The use of a community standard as a norm against which to judge
obscenity, first adopted by the Court in Roth, thus survived subsequent Su-
preme Court obscenity cases with only one exception. The single exception,
which was to apply to material specifically aimed at deviant groups, was
created in Mishkin v. New York."2 There, the Court held that:
[w]here the material is designed for and primarily disseminated to
a clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at large,
the prurient-appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied if the domi-
nant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient
interest in sex of the members of that group."
However, each part of the three-part test must be satisfied. A finding
25 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
2 6 Id. at 419.
27 Id. at 418.
28 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
29 Id. at 24.
30 The Court has viewed Memiors as refining the Roth test, rather than as overruling it, with
the result that the two tests are viewed together as a unified standard. See Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 99 (1974).
3' 413 U.S. at 24.
82 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
3- ld. at 508.
Fall, 1978]
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that the material appealed to the prurient interest of a specific deviant group
to which it was directed would not alone be sufficient to support the con-
clusion that the material is obscene. Even when the deviant group exception
is applicable, community standards must still be used in a determination
of whether the work is patently offensive:"
The basic concept that material should be judged by the vehicle of the
average person applying contemporary community standards had thus sur-
vived the alterations made in the Roth test and was fundamental to the re-
jection of Hicklin by the Court. This concept appears to have originated in
a district court opinion by Judge (later Justice) Learned Hand, United
States v. Kennerly." Although, as Mr. Justice Brennan has observed, Judge
Hand probably did not intend for "community" to be defined beyond the con-
cept of contemporary society at large," the Court has since attempted to
define it at least on a geographical basis. A national community standard
was often thought to be required until Miller held that the use of a state
community was not constitutional error.3
While recognizing that a national standard probably does not exist due
to the pluralism of the nation, 9 the Court did not approach the question of
whether a community standard was improbable on the same grounds within
a smaller locality."0 While later cases have left unclear whether the state or
some smaller area is to be used, the Court has held that, although state laws
dealing with obscenity might give some indication of community standards,
they do not set those standards;"3 it is for the jury to determine the com-
munity standards" as well as whether expert testimony is needed."
From the above and the wording of the standard itself, it would appear
that to find material obscene, the jury must first determine the standards of
34 Although the patently offensive section of the Miller test does not include the phrase
"community standards," it remains the standard by which offensiveness is to be determined
in cases tried under the Miller test. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 300-01
(1977).
3. 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
36Jacobejlis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193 (1964).
37 Id. at 195.
38 413 U.S. at 31.
39 Id. at 32-33.
40 See generally Bell, supra note 13. This article contains an excellent discussion of the
possibility that a local community standard, insofar as that concept is understood to mean
a consensus of opinion, may not in fact exist. It also illustrates how a jury might have
a completely erroneous view of what the community standard is, or how the jury might
believe they know what the standard is when none exists. See also Comment, Community
Standards and the Regulation of Obscenity, 24 DEPAUL L. REv. 185 (1974); Note, 23
EmoRy LJ. 550 (1974).
41 Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 308 (1977).
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its community and then apply those standards to the material in question in
a manner which the jury believes the hypothetical average man would apply
them. However, the Court is inconsistent in its application of the test. In some
instances, a community standard applied by the average person is used,
while in others the standard becomes that of the average person of the com-
munity." If the test is used in the latter form, the community is simply the
determinant of the average man rather than the determinant of the standard,
and that average man becomes the basis of the standard.
Whether the standard is that of the community or that of the average
man in the community, the Supreme Court asserted, from the time of Roth
until as recently as 1977" that, except for the Mishkin deviant group test,
obscenity was not to be determined by its impact on a particularly sensitive
or prudish person or, indeed, on any specific type of person." The degree
to which that assertion remains valid is left in doubt by the Court's decision
in Pinkus.
While the Court in Pinkus did not break fresh ground by upholding
the trial court's instruction pertaining to deviant groups, it did widen the
furrow considerably. The trial court instructed the jury that the first test it
should apply was whether the material "when considered in relation to the
intended and probable recipients, is an appeal to the prurient interest of the
average person of the community as a whole or the prurient interest of mem-
bers of a deviant sexual group at the time of mailing."" When the Supreme
Court introduced the deviant group exception in Mishkin, it stated that for
the exception to be applicable, the material must be "designed for and pri-
marily disseminated to a clearly defined deviant sexual group" instead of the
general public. 8 In Miller the Court affirmed the position holding any por-
tion of the material which was not specifically intended for a deviant group
required the application of the community standards test."9 Reviewing the
-In fact, the inconsistency often appears within the same case. Thus, for example, in
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), the Court states that "a juror is entitled to
draw on his knowledge of the views of the average person ... ," but on the next page states
that "[the result of the Miller cases... is to permit a juror sitting in obscenity cases to draw
on the knowledge of the community or vicinage from which he comes . . . ." id. at 104,
105. Again, in Smith v. United States, 413 U.S. 291 (1977), the opinion reads "obscenity
is to be judged according to the average person in the community .... " but later states
"contemporary community standards must be applied by juries in accordance with their
own understanding of the tolerance of the average person in their community.
Id. at 304, 305.
45 Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
46 Id. at 300 n.6.
4 98 S. Ct. at 1814 (emphasis added).
As 383 U.S. at 508.
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material at issue in Pinkus, the Supreme Court concluded that, while its
prurient interest might be of a greater magnitude to members of deviant
groups,50 "it is equally clear that they were intended to arouse the prurient
interest of any reader or observer."'" The Court also held that, except in the
"extreme case," expert testimony is not needed and the jury is presumed to
know what the reaction of deviant groups to the material will be.5 2 Thus,
it need no longer be shown that material was primarily intended for a deviant
group in order for the jury to utilize the exception to the community standard
test. It appears that if the jury, based on its own knowledge, believes that
the material is likely to appeal more strongly to the prurient interest of a
deviant group, it may use that group rather than the community as a whole
in regard to prurient appeal.
Supreme Court decisions from Roth until Pinkus started by making a
finding of obscenity more difficult, but gradually eased that difficulty. How-
ever, the standard by which obscenity was to be judged remained, until
Pinkus, within the confines of the community standard doctrine, the sole
deviation from the doctrine being the deviant group exception. To the extent
that the Court has attempted to delineate the relevant community, either on
a geographical basis or through its insistence that the community includes
all adults within its physical boundaries, the Court has altered Judge Hand's
concept of a community standard. But to the extent that Pinkus allows any
specific subset to be noticed by the trier-of-fact in determining a standard
against which to assess alleged obscene material, whether that subset is
composed of sensitive, insensitive, deviant or any other type of persons, the
Court has turned its back on the underlying doctrine of Roth and returned
to the nineteenth century standard of Regina v. Hicklin. It would thus appear
that the Court is in less than complete agreement with the view of Judge
Hand, who said: "To put thought in leash to the average conscience of the
time is perhaps tolerable, but to fetter it by the necessities of the lowest and
least capable seems a fatal policy." 5'
CARY DOUGLAS CAESAR
5 0 There was expert testimony at the trial to the effect that some of the material would
appeal to the prurient interests of particular deviant groups, as well as to the prurient
interests of the average person. 98 S. Ct. at 1811.
5198 S. Ct. at 1814.
5Id. at 1814-15.
53 209 F. at 121.
[Vol. 12:2
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